Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a notion of generalized potential games that is inspired by a newly developed theory on generalized gradient flows. More precisely, a game is called generalized potential if the simultaneous gradient of the loss functions is a nonlinear function of the gradient of a potential function. Applications include a class of games arising from chemical reaction networks with detailed balance condition. For this class of games, we prove an explicit exponential convergence to equilibrium for evolution of a single reversible reaction. Moreover, numerical investigations are performed to calculate the equilibrium state of some reversible chemical reactions which give rise to generalized potential games.
Introduction
In the seminal work [MS96] Monderer and Shapley introduced a fundamental concept of (multi-player) potential games 1 . They are a class of games where the incentive of all players to change their strategy can be expressed via a single common function, the potential function. From the mathematical point of view, a game is potential if the simultaneous gradient of the loss functions are equal to the gradient of the potential function (with respect to the corresponding controllable variable) scaled by weight factors. Using the potential function, the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria and the convergence to these equilibria have been shown [MS96, Ros73] . Furthermore, the computation of a Nash equilibrium is reduced to the solution of an optimization problem: finding a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is equivalent to finding a local minimum of the potential function. In practice, Nash equilibria are often computed using the standard gradient descent method. Because of these distinctive Dang contributed to this work when he was at the University of Oslo.
1
In this paper, potential games covers both exact and weighted potential games as defined in [MS96] , cf. Section 2.
features, potential games have been studied intensively in theoretical research as well as have been found in a cornucopia of practical applications in economics [MS96, Ros73, AV01, OS05, MW08] and other disciplines such as artificial intelligence and computer vision [MZ91, YB95] , theoretical computer science, computational social science and sociology [MS09, MS10] and wireless networks [Yam15] . More recently, methods and concepts from game theory have been increasingly used in machine learning. For example, the celebrated Generative Adversarial Networks can be formulated as a two-player zero-sum game between two neural networks (the discriminator and the generator) [GPAM + 14] and learning with bandit feedback can be cast in the framework of potential games [HCM17] . We refer the reader to recent articles [SZ16, LBR + 19, ZKX19] and references therein for further information .
The ultimate goal of this paper is to introduce a generalization of potential games inspired by recent developments in the theory of generalized gradient flows in the field of partial differential equations. In a classical gradient system, the evolution decreases a driving (entropy) functional "as fast as possible" given by a (quadratic) dissipation potential expressing a linear relation between rates and driving forces [Ons31a, Ons31b, Mor86, Ött05] . Solutions to a gradient flow system can also be iteratively approximated using the steepest gradient descent method [AGS08] . Recently, a concept of generalized gradient flows has been introduced where the dissipation potential is not necessarily quadratic [Mie11, MPR14] . This generalization significantly enlarges the class of classical gradient systems and finds new applications in different areas, such as in the modeling of materials (for example, for plasticity and ferromagnetism) and in chemical reaction networks. Furthermore, generalized gradient flows arise in two natural ways: via large-deviation principles from the hydrodynamic limit of microscopic many-particle systems [Duo14, MPR14] or as suitable multiscale limits (evolutionary Γ-convergence) of classical gradient systems [Mie16, LMPR17] . The existence of the potential function as well as the linear relation between the simultaneous gradient of the loss functions and the gradient of the potential function in potential games resemble the existence of the driving functional and the linear relation between rates and driving forces. Motivated by this newly developed theory and the similarities between potential games and classical gradient flows, we introduce a notion of generalized potential games where the simultaneous gradient of loss functions is a nonlinear function of the gradient of a potential function. This notion enlarges significantly the class of games which can be studied using tools from (generalized) gradient flows. Moreover, by providing an alternative criterion of potential games via the symmetrizability of the Hessian matrix, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for a game to be generalized potential.
To show the applicability of our concept, we consider a class of loss functions arising from chemical reaction network theory under detailed balance condition. This theory has been employed in many places, from classical areas such as chemistry [Fei19] Here we bring it to classical game theory. We show in this paper that if a chemical reaction system satisfies the detailed balance condition, then the game arising from this system is generalized potential. This enables us to use the projected gradient steepest descent method to calculate the chemical equilibrium. This is closely related to the trend to equilibrium of the evolution for the chemical reactions. We thus prove an explicit convergence to equilibrium for the case of a single reversible reaction with an arbitrary number of chemical species by the Bakry-Emery strategy. Numerical simulations show the similarity of the evolution and the convergence to stationary point of the potential function in the projected steepest gradient descent method. Therefore, we expect that a discrete version of our proof based on Bakry-Emery strategy will shed light on the convergence of numerical methods for generalized potential games.
To sum up, the main contributions of our paper are the following:
(1) we introduce a notion of generalized potential games enlarging significantly the class of classical potential games; (2) we provide a connection between potential games and symmetrizable matrices, and use this connection to characterize generalized potential games; (3) we calculate numerically the equilibrium sate of several reversible reaction systems, and compare them with the evolution of the system. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we recall the definition of potential games and provide a connection to symmetrizable matrices. The notion of generalized potential games is introduced in Section 3.1 where we also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a game to be generalized potential. Using this condition, we show in Section 3.2 that a game arising from a chemical reaction system is generalized potential if the system satisfies the detailed balance condition. An explicit exponential convergence to equilibrium for the evolution of a single reversible reaction is also given. In Section 4, several games from specific chemical reactions are studied numerically. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to conclusion and outlook.
Potential games and symmetrizable matrices
In this section, we recall the concept of potential games and relevant results, which have attracted a lot of attention recently in the machine learning community [BRM + 18, LBR + 19]. Moreover, we establish a connection between potential games and symmetrizable matrices. Definition 2.1. A n-player differentiable game is a set of players [n] = {1, . . . , n} and twice continuously differentiable loss functions
The objective of each player is to minimize its loss function, that is to seek w * i = argmin w i ∈D i i (w). The simultaneous gradient is the combination of gradients of the losses with respect to the controllable parameters of the corresponding players:
(1)
A point w * ∈ R d is called a fixed point (Nash stationary point) of the game if
An important class of differentiable games are potential games introduced in the seminal paper [MS96] . 
Note that in [MS96] games satisfying condition (2) are called weighted potential games and in particular exact potential games when α i = 1 for all i. An advantage of potential games is that we only need to work with one single potential function φ instead of n different loss functions
. The following theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition to determine a potential game and a useful formula to compute the potential function. 
Under this condition, there exists a potential φ that satisfies
where z : [0, 1] → Z is a continuously differentiable path in Z that connects two strategy profiles z 0 and z 1 , that is z(0) = z 0 and z(1) = z 1 . Furthermore, the potential function is uniquely defined up to an additive constant.
Using the potential function, the existence and attainability of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium have been proved [MS96, Ros73] . Furthermore, it can be numerically computed using the steepest gradient descent method under a broad range of conditions [LSJR16] . There is a vast literature about potential games, and we refer the reader to monographs [NRTV07, LCS16] for great expositions on this topic. Identifying a potential game by showing the existence of the weights in (3) is a non-trivial task. It would be more useful to seek a condition that can be verified intrinsically using only the given loss functions. In the next section, we discuss this issue.
Next, we establish a connection between potential games and symmetrizable matrices. In order to determine whether a game is potential using Definition 2.2, one needs to show the existence of the weighted (α i ) i=1,...,n which is usually difficult. One technique to overcome this issue is to explore the connection between the Hessian of the game (see (5)) and the so-called symmetrizable matrices, which provides an algorithm to check if a game is potential. For more information on symmetrizable matrices we refer the reader to [BK81, VS88] . The construction/existence of a symmetrizer D in Definition 2.4 is often nontrivial. It is more useful to seek a necessary and sufficient condition to verify the symmetrizability of a matrix without invoking externally the existence of the weights. The following lemma provides such a condition. 
Thanks to Lemma 2.5, an algorithm can be provided to determine whether a matrix is symmetrizable or not. Moreover, one can also compute a corresponding symmetrizer, see e.g. [DCD16, Algorithm 1].
We now seek the connection between potential games and symmetrizable matrices. Consider an n-player differentiable game in Definition 2.1. We define the Hessian of the game to be
Condition (3) is then equivalent to the requirement that the matrix M H(w) is symmetric where M = diag(α 1 , . . . , α n ), which means that H(w) is symmetrizable. In particular, a game is exact potential iff the Hessian matrix is symmetric. From this observation and Lemma 2.5 we obtain the following necessary and sufficient conditions, that are based only on the loss functions, for a game to be potential. (
We consider an important class of games recently studied in [Min18] where the loss functions are given by
where theˆ i are generally non-quadratic functions. Note that C is simply the Hessian matrix of i with respect to w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ). According to (3) (see also [Min18, Proposition 3.1]) we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7. The game with loss functions i given by (6) is potential if and only if there exist positive numbers
As a direct application of Theorem 2.6 we obtain the following necessary and sufficient conditions for the game with loss functions (6) to be potential. Note that this condition is directly based on the matrix C only.
Corollary 2.8. The game with loss functions i given by (6) is weighted potential if and only if C is symmetrizable.
Thanks to Lemma 2.5, [DCD16, Algorithm 1] provides an algorithm to determine whether the game with loss functions given by (6) is a potential game or not.
Generalized potential games
In this section, we introduce a generalization of potential games which we call generalized potential games where the simultaneous gradient of the loss functions is a nonlinear function of the gradient of a potential function. In the first part, we give in details the concept, as well as its characterization. The second part provides an example of generalized potential games arising from chemical reaction network theory.
3.1. Generalized potential games. From (1), we notice that (2) is equivalent to
Thus to define a potential game we need three elements: an underlying Hilbert space Z (in this case, Z = R d ), a driving functional φ : Z → R, and an operator that maps the tangential bundle T Z = Z × Z to Z (in this case it is a matrix multiplication with M −1 ). Motivated by this observation and the theory of generalized gradient flow developed recently [Mie11, MPR14] , we provide a concept of generalized potential game.
Given a dissipation potential Ψ, we recall that the Legendre-Fenchel dual (convex dual), Ψ * : Z × T * Z → R, of Ψ, is defined as follows:
The following lemma provides useful properties of Legendre-Fenchel duality.
Lemma 3.2.
[Fen49] Let Z be a reflexive Banach space and Ψ : Z → R ∪ {∞} be proper, convex and lower semicontinuous. Then for every ξ ∈ Z * and every s ∈ Z the following statements are equivalent
Note that in this section, we will use the notation D for the Fréchet differential to indicate that the setup might be applicable to a more general space than R d .
Definition 3.3. A differentiable game with loss functions
is called a generalized potential game if there exist a dissipation potential Ψ : T Z → R and a potential function E : Z → R such that
where ξ(w) is the simultaneous gradient defined in (1).
According to Lemma 3.2 , (11) is equivalent to
Using the duality between Ψ and Ψ * , we have the following equivalences for Conditions (ii) and (iii) in Definition 3.1:
Thus both Ψ ≥ 0 and Ψ * ≥ 0 attain 0 at 0. Condition (11) implies that
so that, as in a potential game, in a generalized potential game the negative of the simultaneous gradient ξ is the same as that of the potential function E. A potential game is a special case of generalized potential games when the dissipation potential is quadratic (i.e., its derivative
where M = diag(α 1 , . . . , α n ). Thus potential games correspond to the case where D ζ Ψ * (ζ) is a linear function of ζ. A generalized potential game is then a natural extension of a potential game since it allows nonlinear games, i.e., D ζ Ψ * (ζ) can be a nonlinear function of ζ. The following theorem extends Theorem 2.3 to generalized potential games:
where z : [0, 1] → Z is a continuously differentiable path in Z that connects two strategy profiles z 0 and z 1 . That is z(0) = z 0 and z(1) = z 1 .
Proof. Condition (12) means that
Applying D w j to both sides, noting that ξ(w) = (∇ w 1 1 , . . . , ∇ wn n ), we get
Using the Hessian matrix H(w) defined in (5), equality (15) can be written as
i.e., the matrix D 2 Ψ(ξ(w))H(w) is symmetric.
Next we prove (14). Let z 0 , z 1 ∈ Z and let z : [0, 1] → Z be a continuously differntiable path connecting z 0 and z 1 . We have
where we have applied the fundamental theorem of calculus, the chain rule and condition (12) to obtain ( * ), ( * * ) and ( * * * ) respectively.
Remark 3.5. In a potential game, using (13), we have
Thus condition (16) becomes
So, we recover the result of Theorem 2.3
Examples in chemical reaction network theory.
In this section, we will show that the generalized potential games corresponding to a class of loss functions arising from general reversible chemical reaction networks.
3.2.1. Chemical reaction networks. Consider K chemical species X 1 , . . . , X K subject to R reversible reactions:
for r = 1, . . . , R. The coefficients α 
A state w ∞ ∈ R The following theorem provides an important class of generalized potential games. This theorem is motivated from a recent theory on the generalized gradient flows of chemical reactions [Mie11, MPR14] . Proof. We show that the game can be viewed as a generalized potential game by showing the existence of a potential function E and a dissipation function Ψ * . These functions have been derived in the context of generalized gradient flow structure of chemical reactions [Mie11] .
Let us define the dissipation Ψ * and the potential function E by
where
Note that Ψ * can be written as the quadratic form
Hence ∇ w Ψ * (w, µ) = H(w)µ. Therefore,
We compute
. . . 
where we have used the detailed balance condition (20) to obtain the last equality. On the other hand, we have for j = 1, . . . , n,
Using the simultaneous gradient in (1) we can write these in a compact form as
From (26) and (27) we get
Hence the game is a generalized potential game.
Remark 3.9. At this point, we remark that the condition in Lemma 2.5 is also a characterization of the detailed balance condition. Indeed, consider a first order reaction network of n chemical species S 1 , . . . , S n which react through the following first order reactions
where a ij , a ji ≥ 0 are reaction rate constants. Then the condition given in Lemma 2.5 is equivalent to the fact that this first order reaction network satisfies the detailed balance condition [Hea53] .
Remark 3.10. We notice that (28) is a generalization of (8) where the constant (and diagonal) matrix M −1 is replaced by H(w) which is dependent on w. It should be mentioned that the pair (E, Ψ) is not uniquely determined. Another choice, which arises from largedeviation theory of interacting systems, is given by [MPR14, MPR16] :
E, andΨ * is a non-quadratic potential function.
The equilibrium of the loss functions defined in (21a)-(21b) agrees with the detailed balance equilibrium of the chemical reaction network presented in (17). Therefore, finding the equilibrium for the game defined in (21a)-(21b) relates strongly to the trend to equilibrium of the evolution system (18). The latter issue is well studied thanks to the recent advances concerning the large time behavior of chemical reaction networks. The following exponential convergence to equilibrium for detailed balanced systems was proved in [DFT17] 3 . Proposition 3.11. Assume that the chemical reaction network (17) is detailed balanced and possesses no boundary equilibria. Then, for each positive initial data, the corresponding solution converges exponentially to the detailed balanced equilibrium within the same compatibility class.
Remark 3.12.
(i) The convergence to equilibrium for a system with boundary equilibria is related to the Global Attractor Conjecture [CDSS09] , which is still a famous open problem in chemical reaction network theory.
(ii) The exponential convergence to equilibrium in Proposition 3.11 was obtained via a contradiction argument, and therefore the convergence rate is not explicit. Up to our knowledge, the explicit convergence rate for (17) is in general unknown. Nevertheless, for a single reversible reaction with an arbitrary number of chemical species, the convergence rate can be calculated explicitly. We demonstrate that result in Proposition 3.13 below.
(ii) If we consider the spatial diffusion for each species in (17), then we obtain a reactiondiffusion system instead of a differential system. The proof of equilibration in this case is much more involved. We refer the interested reader to [FT18] .
Proposition 3.13. Let α 1 , . . . , α m , β 1 , . . . , β n ∈ [1, ∞) and consider the reversible reaction
Denote by a i (t) and b j (t), i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} the concentrations of A i and B j at time t > 0 respectively. Then for any positive initial data (a 0 , b 0 ) ∈ (0, ∞) m+n , the concentrations converge exponentially to equilibrium with computable rates, i.e.
where the constants C 0 and λ can be explicitly computed.
Proof. The proof utilises the Bakry-Emery strategy, and we postpone it to Appendix A in order to not interrupt the train of thought.
We emphasize that although the convergence to equilibrium can be obtained by a contradiction argument (see e.g. [DFT17, Proposition 2.3]), the proof based on the Bakry-Emery method in Appendix A has the advantage of providing an explicit rate of the convergence. Moreover, we believe that the convergence of a discrete version of this method leads to the convergence of algorithms finding equilibrium of the games defined in (21a)-(21b). We leave this interesting point for future investigation.
Numerical investigations
In this section we apply the projected steepest gradient descent method to numerically calculate the Nash equilibrium of generalized potential games arising from some specific chemical reactions. Moreover, we compare the behavior of the numerical schemes with the evolution of the chemical systems to see their close relation.
Consider a general reversible chemical reaction
for r = 1, . . . , R. Suppose that the detailed balance condition (20) is satisfied. According to Proposition 3.6, given an initial state, the reversible chemical reaction (30) possesses a unique positive equilibrium state in the same compatibility class. To take into account the conservation of mass, we will apply the projected gradient descent method, see for instance [CM87, SW18] . Below we consider three concrete examples.
Example 1 (A single reversible reaction) Consider the following chemical reaction:
According to the law of mass action we obtain the following system of differential equations:
The loss functions are given by
The potential function is given by:
Conservation of mass:
Using the projected gradient method, the concentrations of all chemical species in the corresponding chemical reaction converge to a close neighborhood of the equilibrium point ( Fig.1  (a,b) ). In this case, the gradient vector is approximately 0, hence the KKT point is attained (within certain numerical error), and all quantities remain constant near equilibrium. Example 2 (A network of reversible reactions) The example below is from combustion chemistry and models the burning of fuel in a combustion chamber such as in a car engine.
It is remarked that this system can be split into one system of (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 , w 5 , w 6 , w 7 , w 8 ) and one of (w 9 , w 10 ), which are decoupled. For brevity, we will consider only the former system, since the latter is simpler (and can be treated similarly to Example 1). According to the law of mass action we obtain the following system of differential equationṡ w 1 = 2(k 1 w 5 − k 2 w 2 1 ) + (k 7 w 8 − k 8 w 1 w 3 ) + (k 9 w 4 − k 10 w 1 w 2 ) + (k 11 w 7 − k 12 w 1 w 2 2 ) w 2 = 2(k 3 w 6 − k 4 w 2 2 ) + (k 9 w 4 − k 10 w 1 w 2 ) + 2(k 11 w 7 − k 12 w 1 w 2 2 ) w 3 = (k 7 w 8 − k 8 w 1 w 3 ),ẇ 4 = −(k 9 w 4 − k 7 w 1 w 2 ) System (32) has three linearly independent conservation laws, for all t ≥ 0,
By direct computations, for positive initial masses M 1 , M 2 , M 3 > 0, there exists a unique positive equilibrium to (32) satisfying the conservation laws (33) and solving
Therefore, system (32) is detailed balanced. Moreover, there exists no boundary equilibrium (direct verification), and it follows immediately from Proposition 3.11 that any solution to (32) converges exponentially to the detailed balance equilibrium in the same stoichiometric compatibility class. The loss functions in this case are computed as
Under the detailed balance condition, the potential is given by
Similar to the above example, using projected gradient method, the concentrations of all chemical species in the corresponding chemical reaction converge to a close neighborhood of equilibrium point ( Fig.1(c,d) ). In most cases, we observe the oscillations around the equilibrium point. This is due to the finite numerical error when approaching the optimal points of loss functions. Using a smaller time step will reduce oscillations.
This example and the above example show the validity of the projected gradient method in finding equilibria of the chemical reactions.
Example 3 (A reaction network without conservation laws) For simplicity, we assume that all reaction rate constants are one. Denote by w 1 , w 2 , w 3 the concentrations of S 1 , S 2 , S 3 respectively. We obtain, thanks to the law of mass actioṅ By applying gradient descend on the loss functions in (36), the concentrations of all chemical species in the corresponding chemical reaction converge to the equilibrium point (Fig. 2) .
Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper, we develop the concept of generalized potential games enlarging significantly the class of potential games. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a game to be generalized potential using the connection of this concept to symmetrizable matrices. To show the applicability, we consider generalized potential games arising from chemical reaction network theory with detailed balance condition. Moreover, we use the projected steepest gradient descent method to calculate numerically the Nash equilibrium of generalized potential games and compare them with the evolution of the corresponding chemical reaction systems.
The numerical comparison in this paper hints that there's a close connection between the trend to equilibrium of chemical reaction systems and the convergence of numerical methods for generalized potential games. More precisely, we believe that the convergence of a discrete version of this method (see e.g. [JS17] ) leads to the convergence of algorithms finding equilibrium of the games defined in (21a)-(21b). This interesting fact is contained in our forthcoming work. Non-Equilibrium Reversible and Irreversible Coupling) framework in non-equilibrium thermodynamics [Ött05] . A great advantage of the GENERIC framework is that it not only automatically fulfills the laws of thermodynamics but also provides geometrical and physical structures. In this paper we have extended potential games to generalized potential games akin to the irreversible part of a GENERIC formulation. It would be interesting to further employ methodology and techniques from the GENERIC framework to understand and control the dynamics in general games. We leave this topic for future research.
Appendix A. Explicit convergence to equilibrium
In this appendix, we show the explicit convergence to equilibrium for the single reversible reaction (29). For simplicity, we assume without loss of generality that k f = k r = 1. Denote a i (t) and b j (t) as the concentrations of A i and B j respectively at time t ≥ 0, for all i = 1, . . . , m and j = 1, . . . , n. The general system (18) in this case reads as
where we recall the convention (19). The solution to (S) obeys the following conservation laws
, for all i = 1, . . . , m, j = 1, . . . , n.
The vector M = (M ij ) i=1,...,m, j=1,...,n is called the vector of initial masses. It is easy to see that there are precisely m + n − 1 linearly independent conservations laws in (37). Thus, once we fix a suitable set of m + n − 1 components of M , then all other laws can be derived therefrom. For instance, M is completely defined if M 1j and M i1 are fixed for all i = 1, . . . , m and j = 1, . . . , n. The following Lemma follows from Proposition 3.6. 
To study the convergence to equilibrium for (S) we consider the entropy
where ϕ(z) = z log z − z + 1, the relative entropy
and its corresponding entropy dissipation 
Proof of Proposition 3.13. We will employ the Bakry-Emery strategy. The proof is divided into several steps.
Step 1 Step 2. We prove that there exists an explicit constant λ > 0 such that
We will utilize the conservation laws and distinguish two cases: (i) if for some i 0 ∈ {1, . . . , m}, a i 0 ≤ 
From (42) and (43) we get (41) with
Step 3 The projected steepest gradient descent algorithm to solve this problem is described in Algorithm 1 [Fre04] .
Algorithm 1 Projected steepest gradient descent algorithm 0:
Step 0: Initialize x 0:
Step 1: Compute ∇f (x). 0:
Step 2: Find moving direction Step 3: Update x = x + αd. Go to step 1.
